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Berns: Chris-Craft: Changing Perspectives on Contests for Corporate Cont

NOTES
CHRIS-CRAFT: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 1968, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-Craft), a Delaware corporation, purchased 5200 shares of the Piper Aircraft
Corporation (Piper).' This purchase initiated one of the most
"sophisticated and hard fought ' 2 contests for control in corporate
history. The litigation generated by the takeover battle spanned
eight years, 3 culminating in the Supreme Court's decision 4 to overturn the largest judgment ever awarded under the federal securities
5
laws: $35.8 million.

The Supreme Court, overruling various court of appeals' decisions, held (1) that a tender offeror, suing in his capacity as a
takeover bidder, does not have standing to sue for damages 6 under
section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 (the Exchange
1.

Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
2. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1131
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
3. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569
(2d Cir. 1970) (Chris-Craft I) (denial of preliminary injunction); SEC v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973) (Bangor Punta obligated to offer rescission to
shareholders who had accepted its exchange offer); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (Chris-Craft11) (defendants found in violation of securities laws and subject to damage suit); Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973) (cross claim by Bangor Punta against Chris-Craft dismissed);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926 (1977) (Chris-CraftIl) (district court's measure
of damages modified by court of appeals, and subsequently reversed on other
grounds by Supreme Court).
4. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
5. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at 51, col. 1.
6. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 950 (1977).
7. Section 14(e) is the antifraud provision regulating tender offers:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
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Act). Therefore, Chris-Craft, as a defeated tender offeror, had no
implied cause of action under that provision; (2) that a defeated
tender offeror does not have standing under rule 10b-6 8 to sue for
damages arising from the lost opportunity to control the target company;9 and (3) that the court of appeals had improvidently issued an
injunction prohibiting Bangor Punta Corporation (Bangor Punta)
from voting for five years the illegally acquired shares "premised as
it was upon the impermissible award of damages."' 10
In deciding these issues, the Court left many others unanswered. Although it held that a defeated tender offeror has no implied private cause of action under section 14(e), the Court left
undecided whether this right might accrue to any other party."
The Court also did not address the general applicability of rule
10b-6 to takeover contests.' 2 Furthermore, the new standard of
causation set forth in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion' 3 may
present substantial problems to future litigants, because it places a
heavier burden of proof on plaintiffs. In addition to undertaking a
critical evaluation of the majority's decision, this note will examine
the issues left unaddressed by the Court and draw conclusions
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are

made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to
or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as used in section 10(b) of the act for any person,
(1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particular
distribution of securities, or
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is being made, or
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate or is participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, either
alone or with one or more other persons, to bid for or purchase for any
account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security which is the
subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and series,
or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to induce any
person to purchase any such security or right, until after he has completed his participation in such distribution ....
9. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 950 (1977). The target
company is the company whose securities are the target of the takeover bid.
10. See id. at 952.
11. See id. at 949 n.28.
12. See id. at 951.
13. Id. at 953-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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regarding the impact of Chris-Craft on future tender offers. To
understand the issues raised by the Supreme Court's decision, a
review of the facts surrounding the Chris-Craft litigation is essential.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Facts

In late 1968, Chris-Craft initiated an attempt to take over Piper
by making open market purchases of Piper stock. 14 By midJanuary, Chris-Craft had purchased approximately 13% of Piper's
1,644,790 outstanding shares. 15 On January 23, Chris-Craft's president publicly announced a tender offer 16 for up to 300,000 Piper
shares,' 7 at $65 per share, 18 $12.50 more than the price Piper
stock had closed at the previous day on the New York Stock Exchange. 19
Piper reacted by calling a meeting on January 23 with its investment advisor, The First Boston Company (First Boston), its
legal counsel, Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside and Wolff, and its
auditors, Arthur Young & Co. On January 24, Piper management
announced its decision to oppose Chris-Craft's bid for control.2 0 To
14. Id. at 931.
15. Id.
16. A tender offer is generally defined as:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase [at a premium] during a fixed period of time all or a
portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a
specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973).
See generally Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp.
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECU~rIES REGULATION 936-37 (3d
ed. 1972); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973); Note, The Courts and
the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1973). However,
the SEC has refused to define the term "tender offer" because of the "dynamic"
nature of these transactions, and the need to remain flexible in dealing with the
diverse forms they may assume. See also Securities Act Release No. 5731, Exchange
Act Release No. 12676 (Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,695-96.
17. Chris-Craft reserved the right to purchase additional shares if more than
300,000 were tendered. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 931 n.1
(1977).
18. Id. at 931.
19. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 351 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
20. There is some dispute as to the reason for Piper's opposition. Chris-Craft
claims that Piper never studied the offer before deciding to oppose it, see Brief of
Respondent Chris-Craft at 6, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977)
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counter Chris-Craft's activities, First Boston began soliciting offers
21
for Piper shares from other companies.
Piper management sent several letters to its shareholders during January 25 to 27, urging them to reject Chris-Craft's offer. Management wrote that it had "carefully studied this offer and [was]
convinced that it [was] inadequate and not in the best interests of
Piper's shareholders." 22 However, Piper management did not disclose that First Boston had advised them that the $65 price offered
23
by Chris-Craft was "fair and equitable."
At the same time, Piper negotiated an agreement with the
Grumman Aircraft Corporation (Grumman) whereby Grumman was
to purchase 300,000 authorized but unissued Piper shares at $65
per share, 2 4 the s%'me price which Chris-Craft was offering. This
was designed to increase Piper's outstanding shares to 1,944,790,
making it more difficult for Chris-Craft to gain control. 25 Grumman
was given an option to put 26 the shares back to Piper after six months
at cost, plus 3 1/2% interest per annum. 2 7 Piper was also required to
segregate the proceeds from the Grumman sale in a fund free from
liens.
On January 29, Piper wrote a letter to its shareholders and
issued a press release announcing the Grumman sale. However,
there was no mention of the specific terms of the agreement. The
agreement was never effectuated because the New York Stock Ex[hereinafter cited as Brief for Chris-Craft]. Piper claimed that it extensively surveyed
Chris-Craft after learning of Chris-Craft's offer. It asserted that Chris-Craft's "track
record," that is, its management's prior corporate history, did not inspire confidence

in its ability to operate the company effectively. Piper also claimed that it was concerned with those shareholders who would be left "hanging in limbo," since
Chris-Craft's offer was for only 300,000 shares, see Brief for Petitioner Piper Aircraft
Corp. at 6, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
21. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 931 (1977).
22. Id. The letter was prepared by D.F. King & Co., a proxy soliciting firm. It
was reviewed by the Piper family and its legal counsel. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 351 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973).
23. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
24. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 931 (1977).
25. To gain control, it was necessary for Chris-Craft to acquire over 50% of
Piper's shares. Instead of needing 822,395 shares, Chris-Craft would need at least
972,395 shares, considerably more, if 300,000 additional shares were issued.
26. A "put" is an arrangement whereby one party purchases shares of a corporation while retaining the option to sell the same shares back to the seller at a later
date at a specified price. W. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SECURITIES LAw 2-163 (1973).
27. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 351 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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change refused to list the 300,000 new Piper shares. 28
By the expiration of Chris-Craft's tender offer on February 3,
Chris-Craft had managed to purchase approximately 33% of Piper's
outstanding shares. 29 To acquire the additional 17% required for
control, Chris-Craft decided to make an exchange offer of ChrisCraft securities for Piper shares. Accordingly, on February 27,
Chris-Craft filed an S-1 registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) along with a preliminary prospectus for an exchange offer to acquire between 80,000 and
300,000 Piper shares.
In March 1969, after the Grumman agreement fell through,
Piper commenced negotiations with Bangor Punta, a Delaware
corporation, looking towards a possible merger.3 0 On May 8, the
Piper family agreed to transfer 501,090 of its own Piper shares to
Bangor Punta, which would have given Bangor Punta a 31%
interest. 31 Bangor Punta promised to use its "best efforts"3 2 to acquire the additional shares it would need to bring its holdings in
the company to over 50%. Bangor Punta proposed to make an exchange offer of Bangor Punta securities for Piper common stock. A
press release announced that Piper shareholders would receive
Bangor Punta securities valued by First Boston at $80 per Piper
share.3 3 In the registration materials filed with the SEC and reviewed by First Boston, Bangor Punta stated that one of its subsidiaries, the Bangor and Aroostock Railroad (BAR), was valued at
$18.4 million.3 4 This valuation was based on an appraisal made by
investment bankers four years earlier. Bangor Punta did not reveal
that in current negotiations for the sale of BAR, it had been valued
at only $5 million. 3 5
In May 1969, prior to the effective date of the Bangor Punta
exchange offer, Bangor Punta made three block purchases of
120,200 shares (7%) of Piper stock in privately negotiated off-the28. See id.
29. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 931 (1977).
30. Id. at 932. One method employed by a target corporation opposing a
takeover bid is to merge with another firm which appears more attractive to the
target corporation. This tactic is termed a "defensive" merger, see Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 322 (1967).
For other defensive tactics employed by target corporations, see note 128 infra.
31. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 932 (1977).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 933.
35. Id.
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market exchanges. 3 6 These purchases were effected despite the
SEC's announcement of its proposed rule 10b-13, a provision
which prohibits a tender offeror from purchasing the target
company's stock while an exchange offer is pending.3 7 By August
1969, at the expiration of the competing exchange offers, Bangor
Punta owned 44.5% of the outstanding Piper shares while ChrisCraft owned 40.6%.38 Bangor Punta continued to buy Piper shares
on the open market until September 5, when it owned approximately 51% of Piper's outstanding stock. 39 Chris-Craft, after investing more than $44 million, 40 had lost the battle for control of
Piper.
B.

PriorLitigation

Chris-CraftI
Even while both sides were seeking to acquire shares of Piper,
the takeover contest moved to the courts. Chris-Craft filed suit in
the Southern District of New York in May 1969, against Bangor
Punta, the Piper family, and First Boston. It alleged that Bangor
Punta had violated rule 10b-6 by purchasing blocks of Piper shares
in May while simultaneously engaging in an exchange offer. It
further claimed that Bangor Punta had violated an SEC "gunjumping" provision 41 by issuing a press release reporting the $80
36. Id. at 932.
37. Rule 10b-13 is a codification of existing interpretations of rule 10b-6. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969), reprinted in [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,706, at 83,617.

38. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 933 (1977).
39. Id. Chris-Craft purchased 29,200 shares for cash after the expiration of its
exchange offers. In mid-August 1969, Chris-Craft ceased its purchases of Piper stock,
conceding defeat in the takeover contest. There is some dispute as to why ChrisCraft withdrew from the takeover contest. Judge Mansfield, in Chris-Craft 11, believed that Chris-Craft had "shot its bolt" by February 1969, and was not in a position to purchase for cost any appreciable amount of Piper shares over and above the
shares tendered initially, see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Chris-Craft claimed that it would
have had sufficient financial resources to continue purchasing shares in August 1969
if it had had a reasonable opportunity to win the battle for control of Piper, see Brief
for Chris-Craft, supra note 20, at 88.
40. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 354-55 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
(a) For the purposes only of section 5 of the Act, a notice given by an
issuer that it proposes to make a public offering of securities to be registered
under the Act shall not be deemed to offer any securities for sale if such
notice states that the offering will be made only by means of a prospectus

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss1/11

6

Berns: Chris-Craft: Changing Perspectives on Contests for Corporate Cont
1977]

CHRIS-CRAFT: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

valuation of Bangor Punta's securities. Bangor Punta and First Boston were further charged with failing to disclose the true value of
BAR in Bangor Punta's registration statement filed in connection
with its exchange offer. Chris-Craft also claimed that the Piper faroily had violated section 14(e), section 10(b), 42 and rule 10b-5 4 3 by
omitting material facts from its letter and press release of January
27 to Piper shareholders. The letter had described the Chris-Craft
offer as "inadequate," and the press release neglected to mention
Grumman's option to put the shares to Piper at cost plus interest.
Chris-Craft demanded damages and asked that Bangor Punta be
enjoined both from voting the illegally purchased Piper shares and
from accepting shares tendered by Piper shareholders through
Bangor Punta's exchange offer. 4 4
In July 1969, Chris-Craft moved for a preliminary injunction
to prevent Bangor Punta from gaining and exercising control of
Piper. 45 The district court denied Chris-Craft relief on all counts.
Judge Tenney concluded that the May 8 press release did not vioand contains no more than the following additional information:

(1) The name of the issuer;
(2) The title, amount, and basic terms of the securities proposed
to be offered, the amount of the offering, if any, to be made by selling
security holders, the anticipated time of the offering and a brief statement of the manner and purpose of the offering without naming the
underwriters; [and]
(4) In the case of an offering of securities in exchange for other securities of the issuer or of another issuer, the name of the issuer and the
title of the securities to be surrendered in exchange for the securities to
be offered, the basis upon which the exchange may be made ....
[6](b) Any notice contemplated by this section may take the form
of a news release or a written communication directed to security holders or employees, as the case may be, or other published statement.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
43. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC to implement § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
44. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569
(2d Cir. 1970).
45. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 933 (1977).
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late the SEC's gun-jumping provisions 46 and that Bangor Punta's
block purchases did not violate rule 10b-6. 47 Judge Tenney also
denied Chris-Craft's motion for a preliminary injunction, because
Chris-Craft failed to establish the threat of irreparable injury or the
48
likelihood of success on the merits.
Chris-Craft appealed to the Second Circuit, which found that
Bangor Punta had violated the SEC's gun-jumping provisions. 4 9
Furthermore, it held that Chris-Craft would prevail unless Bangor
Punta could prove that its block purchases fell within one of the
exemptions to rule 10b-6. 50 However, the court upheld the district
court's denial of injunctive relief, asserting: "Chris-Craft was free to
compete equally with Bangor Punta for the remaining Piper shares,
and it did so. We do not understand Chris-Craft to allege that the
prior misdeeds of Bangor Punta so determined the course of the
competition . . . that Chris-Craft was placed at any real dis51
advantage."
Then, the SEC joined the litigation, filing suit against Bangor
Punta for omitting the more current and adverse information regarding the value of BAR in Bangor Punta's registration statement. 52 The SEC sought an injunction ordering Bangor Punta to
make an offer of rescission to the Piper shareholders who had exchanged their shares for Bangor Punta stock, as well as a general
injunction against Bangor Punta's engaging in future violations of
the securities laws.
46. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 198.

48. Judge Tenney stated that Chris-Craft was not irreparably harmed because
"neither party had gained control of Piper, and both were still in a position to do
so." Id. at 199.
49. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 577 (2d
Cir. 1970).

50. See id. The court remanded so that Bangor Punta could attempt to establish
that the block purchases fell within one of the eleven exemptions to rule 10b-6. The

exemption most applicable to Bangor Punta's situation included "unsolicited privately negotiated purchases [of stock] effected neither on a securities exchange nor
from or through a broker or dealer .... 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3)(ii) (1977).
51. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir.
1970).
52. The SEC originally became aware of the takeover contest when Chris-Craft
filed a Schedule 13D, as required under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). Accordingly, when Bangor Punta entered the contest in late spring of 1969, the SEC had knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.
In the SEC's view, Bangor Punta's omission of the adverse information concerning
BAR required the SEC to bring the injunctive action.
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The district court found that Bangor Punta's registration statement was not intentionally misleading. Nonetheless, it required
Bangor Punta to offer rescission to those Piper shareholders who
had accepted the exchange offer. 53 The court did not grant the general injunction against future violations because it believed that the
SEC had not proven that Bangor Punta had a "propensity or natural
inclination to violate the securities law." 5 4 However, the Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate ChrisCraft's action for damages.
Chris-Craft11
On remand, District Judge Pollack held that the various Piper
letters to its shareholders describing Chris-Craft's offer as "inadequate" were not misleading because they referred to matters other
than price. 55 The court found that Piper's failure to mention the
option with Grumman could not seriously have injured Chris-Craft,
since Chris-Craft had continued to purchase Piper shares. 56 The district court also held that although the May 8 press release technically violated the SEC's gun-jumping rules, it was neither false
nor misleading, 57 and that Chris-Craft had failed to show consequent
58
injury.
The district court barred recovery on Chris-Craft's claim that
Bangor Punta had overvalued BAR in its registration statement.
The court concluded that Chris-Craft had failed to demonstrate that
Bangor Punta had the requisite mental state to commit fraud. Instead, it found Bangor Punta's action to be a "mere negligent omission or misstatement of fact." 59 Moreover, the court held that
Chris-Craft failed to prove that its injury was caused by Bangor
60
Punta's violation.
53.

See SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y.

1971), modified, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
54.

Id. at 1163.

55. The court believed that "inadequate" referred to Piper management's
views of the company's prospects if Chris-Craft acquired control, or to the quality of
Chris-Craft's management, see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F.
Supp. 1128, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1137.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1140.
60. Id.at 1139. Judge Pollack differed with the Supreme Court's holding in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), which established a presumption of causation in a § 14(a) suit if the misleading proxy solicitation was an "essen-
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Although Judge Pollack found that Bangor Punta's purchases
did not fall within one of the exemptions to rule 10b-6,6 1 he held
against Chris-Craft on the merits. There was no proof, he asserted,
that "absent Bangor Punta's acquisitions of these blocks, Chris-

Craft would have achieved its goal of control."6 2 Codefendant First
Boston was similarly held not liable for its activities in reviewing
Bangor Punta's registration statement because it had not engaged
"in any course of conduct which operated as a fraud or deceit upon
Chris-Craft or the public shareholders of Piper."6 3 Both ChrisCraft and the SEC appealed the district court's decision.6 4 This
time, the Second Circuit held Piper, Bangor Punta, and First
Boston jointly and severally liable because their violations of the
securities laws contributed to the undeserved success of Bangor
65
Punta's takeover bid.
The Second Circuit then reviewed Chris-Craft's section 14(e)
claim that defendant had fraudulently engaged in activities to defeat Chris-Craft's takeover bid. The court held that Piper's letter
derogating Chris-Craft's offer and Piper's failure to disclose the
terms of the Grumman arrangement constituted false and misleading activities. 66 Furthermore, the court found that Bangor Punta
"showed reckless disregard"6 7 in failing to disclose the latest BAR
negotiations reflecting the decreased value of BAR.
The case was again remanded to the district court for a calcutial link in the accomplishment of the transaction." Id. at 385. See also text accompanying notes 234-253 infra. Judge Pollack distinguished Mills, stating that the
misleading proxy statement directly affected the shareholders on whose behalf the
suit was brought, see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp.
1128, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973). Chris-Craft, in contrast, was trying to recover damages because of the misstatements' effect on third parties. Judge Pollack felt it was essential that Chris-Craft
prove that Piper shareholders had exchanged their holdings for Bangor Punta stock
instead of for Chris-Craft shares. He stated: "[T]here is no proof that a single exchanging Piper shareholder would have refrained from the exchange and taken an
offer for his shares from Chris-Craft instead ....[Sluch proof is essential to sustain a
10b-5 claim." Id. (emphasis in original).
61. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1142
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1145.
64. See SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 924 (1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
65. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
66. See id. at 364-65.
67. Id. at 369. Bangor Punta was, however, found not to have violated the SEC's
gun-jumping provisions. Id. at 366-67.
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lation of Chris-Craft's damages. 68 The district court was further instructed to enjoin Bangor Punta from voting the Piper shares acquired through the unlawful exchange offers for five years. 6 9
Christ-CraftIII
Focusing on Chris-Craft's lost opportunity to control Piper,
the district court awarded Chris-Craft damages of $1,673,988.70
The court also issued the voting injunction in accordance with the
court of appeals's instructions. 71 Defendants Piper, Bangor Punta,
and First Boston appealed the district court's decision. The Second
Circuit upheld the injunction 72 but recalculated the damage
award. 73 It calculated the difference in price between what ChrisCraft paid for the shares and what it would have sold the shares for
after Bangor Punta had gained control. 7 4 This formula produced
68. See id. at 379-80. The damages were to be measured by determining "the
reduction in the appraisal value of Chris-Craft's Piper holdings attributable to Bangor
Punta's taking a majority position and reducing Chris-Craft to a minority position,
and Bangor Punta's being able to compel a merger at any time." Id. at 380.
69. See id.
70. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977). The district court apparently ignored the Second Circuit's method of calculating damages. It asserted that
the damages attributable to the possibility of an unfavorable compelled merger were
too difficult to quantify, see id. at 514. Instead, the district court focused upon
Chris-Craft's loss of opportunity to compete for control of Piper, see id. at 515. This
court, through expert testimony, established a hypothetical "fair market value" of $48
per share for Chris-Craft's Piper stock on September 5, 1967, the date that Bangor
Punta gained control, see id. at 515-17. This was based on the assumption that the
14% holdings that Bangor Punta illegally acquired were still in the hands of the
public. Accordingly, on that date, Chris-Craft would have had 42% of Piper's outstanding shares, compared to 37% for Bangor Punta. Then, through expert testimony,
the court determined that a potential buyer of Chris-Craft's 42% who desired to gain
control of Piper would pay a maximum 5% premium for the block, for the opportunity
to compete for control against Bangor Punta's hypothetical opposing block of 37%,
see id. at 523. The court concluded that by losing the opportunity to gain control of
Piper, Chris-Craft had suffered damages equivalent to 5% of $48 for each share it
owned, or $1,673,988, see id.
71. See id. at 526.
72. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 192 (2d
Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct.
926 (1977).
73. See id. at 186-90.
74. See id. at 185, 188-90. The Second Circuit's damages formulation varied
from the district court's in two respects. First, the Second Circuit implicitly included
in damages the value of the lost opportunity to compete for control, together with
any decrease in the value of Chris-Craft's Piper shares derived from any other origin.
Second, the court held that the price Chris-Craft paid for its Piper stock should be
used in place of a hypothetical price established by expert testimony in determining
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damages of $25,793,365,75 with prejudgment interest recomputed
from $600,000 to approximately $10 million. v 6 This resulted in a
total award of nearly $36 million, the largest judgment in securities
77
history.
III.

TBE SUPREME CourT's FIRST HOLDING

Denial of Standing Under Section 14(e)
A. The Court's Reasoning
The Court held that Chris-Craft, as a defeated tender offeror,
had no implied cause of action for damages under section 14(e). 78
This holding will assuredly have a great impact on the conduct of
future takeover contests.
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not
expressly provide private remedies. Thus, the Supreme Court
analyzed the legislative history of section 14(e)7 9 to determine
Congress' intent in enacting this statute. The Court noted the
problems that inhere in relying on legislative history to determine
congressional intent.8 0 Nonetheless, the Court relied heavily on
legislative history in arriving at its decision. 8 '
Quoting extensively from the House and Senate reports on
the Williams Act,8 2 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion conthe value of the opportunity to compete for control, see id. at 185-86. For criticism of
the court's formula for damages, see Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain Evolution
of Section 14(e), 76 COLUM. L. REv. 634, 659-73 (1976); Note, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1239 (1976).
75. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d.172, 190 (2d Cir.

1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct.
926 (1977). The court calculated the prior value as the average price Chris-Craft paid
for its Piper shares, approximately $64. The subsequent value was calculated, with
the assistance of expert testimony, as $27, the amount Chris-Craft could receive for
its block of shares after Bangor Punta had acquired control. Chris-Craft was, therefore, entitled to per-share damages of approximately $37. This amounted to a total
damage award of $25,793,365.
76. Id. at 191.
77. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at 51, col. 1.
78. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
79. Full Disclosureof CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings]; H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

80.
81.
82.
curities

See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 941-42 (1977).
See id. at 942-46.
The Williams Act is the popular name of the 1968 amendments to the SeExchange Act of 1934 designed to regulate tender offers, of which § 14(e) is
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eluded that protection of the individual shareholder of the target
company was the "sole purpose" of the legislation.8 3 The Court
dismissed Chris-Craft's argument that a private right of action
could be implied in the statute. Chris-Craft had argued that a right
of action should be implied because Congress had committed itself
to a policy of evenhandedness8 4 in takeover legislation. As Chief
Justice Burger asserted: "Neutrality is . . . but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors."85 Chief Justice Burger viewed the legislation as
"designed solely to get needed information to the investor," 8 6 and
not to protect the opposing parties in the tender offer battle.
Although it recognized the SEC's concern "with the 'plight' of
takeover bidders faced with 'unfair practices of entrenched management,' "87 the Court did not establish an implied cause of action for the offeror. Rather, the Supreme Court's concern was with
improving the climate in which a shareholder can make an in88
formed investment decision.
The majority's discussion of Chris-Craft's lack of standing
89
under section 14(e) focused, finally, on an analysis of Cort v. Ash.
Cort involved the application of a statute9" regulating corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal office. Cort enumerated four
factors relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implied in a statute:9 1
an integral part, Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending 15

U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1964)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), § 78n(d)-(f), (Supp.
V 1965-69)), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
83. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 946 (1977). Chief
Justice Burger quoted from the testimony of then Chairman of the SEC, Manuel F.
Cohen: "We are concerned with the investor who today is just a person in a form of
industrial warfare .... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is our
concern and our only concern." Id. at 942. (emphasis supplied by Burger, C.J.) Chief
Justice Burger also quoted from the testimony of Professor Hayes:
The two major protagonists-the bidder and the defending management--do not need any additional protection, in our opinion. They have the
resources and the arsenal of moves and countermoves which can adequately
protect their interests. Rather, the investor who is the subject of these entreaties of both major protagonists-is the one who needs a more effective
champion.
."
Id. at 943 (emphasis supplied by Burger, C.J.).
84. Id. at 943-44.
85. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 943 (1977).
86. Id. at 944.
87. Id. at 945.
88. Id. at 942-49.
89. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. V 1975).
91. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975).
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(1) Whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted .... "92
(2) Whether there is "any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create a remedy or to deny one
"93

(3) Whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff
"94

(4) Whether "the cause of action [is] one traditionally rele-

gated to state law ....-

5

In considering the first factor, the Supreme Court believed
that the legislative history showed clearly that Chris-Craft was not
the intended beneficiary of the legislation. 9 6 In applying the second prong of the Cort test, the Court noted that although Congress
did not expressly deny a damages remedy to tender offerors as a
class, neither did it expressly create one. Indeed, the Court
viewed the legislative history as "evinc[ing] the narrow intent to
curb the unregulated activities of tender offerors. . . . [T]his purpose . . . negates the claim that tender offerors were intended to

have additional weapons in the form of an implied cause of action
for damages . .

.97

With regard to the third factor under the Cort analysis, the
Court believed that allowing Chris-Craft to collect $36 million
would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the statute,
that is, investor protection. 98 The Court asserted that, even if shareholders benefit by allowing tender offerors damages such as those
awarded to Chris-Craft, the goal of shareholder protection could
"more directly be achieved with other, less drastic means." 99 The
Court failed to specify these means.
Finally, in applying the fourth criterion, the Court concluded
that " 'it is entirely appropriate in this instance to relegate [the
offeror-bidder] and others in [that] situation to whatever remedy is
created by state law.' "100

Through analysis of the legislative history, the majority thus
92. Id. at 78.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95. Id.
96.

See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 947 (1977).

97. Id.
98.

See id. at 948.

99. Id. at 949.
100. Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975)).
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concluded that Chris-Craft, in its status as a defeated tender offeror, had no standing to sue for damages under section 14(e).10 1
B.

Analysis of Court's Reasoning

Private Actions in the Enforcement of Federal Securities Laws
The denial of a private remedy to Chris-Craft eliminated one
of the most effective means of insuring compliance with federal
securities laws. Although the SEC may institute judicial proceedings when it appears that a violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 is imminent, 10 2 there is no statutory recognition of private
rights of action. 10 3 In J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,10 4 the Supreme
Court indicated the impracticality of expecting the SEC to police
all securities violations. It was this recognition that led the Court
to declare: "Private enforcement . . .provides a necessary supplement- to Commission action."'1 5 Accordingly, courts grant implied
rights of action for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.106
101. See id. at 950.
102. Section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in pertinent
part: "Upon application of the Commission the district courts of the United States
...shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders commanding (1) any person to comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules,
regulations, and orders thereunder .... 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (Supp. V 1975).
103. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, provides for private enforcement under certain conditions. For example, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (Supp. V
1975), authorizes a private action for damages for any person who relied on a materially misleading statement filed with the SEC under the Act and purchased or sold as
security at a price which was affected by such a statement, unless the defendant can
prove he acted in good faith and was unaware that the statement was false and misleading. Furthermore, § 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
[A]ny person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation
'. . of this section, shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or sell
any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue in law or in equity . . . to recover the damages
sustained ....

15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970).
104. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
105. Id. at 432.
106. The private remedy for violations of the federal securities laws is wellestablished, see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (§ 14(a)); List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5, § 15(c)(1)); Mills v. Saijem
Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955) (§ 10(b), § 15(c)(1) and rules thereunder);
Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949) (§ 10(b), rule 10b-5, § 11(d), rule 17a-5); Appel v. Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (§ 7); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
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In Chris-Craft II the Second Circuit expanded on the necessity of private litigation in thi securities area. In addition to noting
Congress' concern for "the plight of the average public investor
who is at a serious disadvantag in dealing with persons possessing
superior knowledge, skill and
ouesrces," 1 0 Judge Timbers asserted other considerations:
The integrity and efficiency of the securities markets are even
more important since our entire economy is dependent upon
these markets. The securities market performs the essential
function of assessing the value that society places upon the efforts of a particular enterprise so that society can obtain the maximum amount of its preferred goods and services that our resources can produce. This function can be performed effectively
only if the delicately calibrated balance of factors affecting demand and supply are allowed to have their impact upon the
market place through an unrestricted flow of information and
funds .... The securities laws seek to prevent restrictions which
distort the market's estimate of value. Considering the weighty
interests at stake, Congress and the courts justifiably have outlawed all unfair and deceptive practices related to the trading of
securities and have encouraged private damage actions to implement the enforcement of the federal securities laws.10 8
Despite the widely accepted efficacy of private actions, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to grant Chris-Craft, a defeated
tender offeror, the right to sue to effectuate the aims of the Williams Act.
Private Actions Under the Williams Act
The Court's holding that a defeated tender offeror has no
standing to sue under section 14(e) is most significant. The majority's decision means that "no matter how flagrant Bangor Punta's
violation may have been, no matter how direct the causal connection between that violation and Chris-Craft's injury, and no matter
how serious the injury," 10 9 Chris-Craft cannot recover damages. A
careful analysis of the legislative history of the Williams Act and
judicial precedent demonstrates that allowing a private cause of action for Chris-Craft is advisable.
107. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
108. Id. (citation omitted).
109. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Similarity of Section 14(e) to Section 14(a)
Despite its concession that private actions are useful in the
securities area, the Supreme Court in Chris-Craft refused to permit a private action under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. This denial of standing is paradoxical in light of the
Court's recognition of a private right of action under section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act 1 0 in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak."'1 Borak established that an investor can bring a private action for damages
under section 14(a) for a misleading proxy solicitation. The Court
stated that since one of the chief purposes of section 14(a) is "the
protection of investors, [that] certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.""12 After
Borak other courts recognized implied actions under section 14(a)
3
for shareholders, management, and rivals for control."1
The Williams Act, of which section 14(e) is an integral part,
was enacted to subject tender offers to the same rules as proxy
contests. As Senator Williams, for whom the legislation is named,
declared: "[TJhis legislation is patterned on the present law and
regulations that govern proxy contests. ' " 4 Shortly after the Act's
passage, the SEC stated:
[The] new legislation was clearly intended to provide the same
scope of protection as the existing proxy rules of Section 14....
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen of the Commission repeatedly
analogized the tender offer situation to a proxy dispute and
urged that the need for protection may be greater in the case of
a tender offer. .

.

.We believe it would be anomalous to con-

clude that Congress did not intend the same scope of protection
for all situations arising under Section 14 absent any expression
5
to the contrary"11

110.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).

111.
112.

377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Id. at 432.

113. Stockholders: General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159,
161 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). Management: Greater Iowa
Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 794 (8th Cir. 1967); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,
360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). Rivals: Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W.Ry., 226 F.
1964), cited in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969).
114. 113 CONG. REc. 24,665 (1967).
115. Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 8-9, Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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The Supreme Court took one step toward investor protection
by allowing private actions under section 14(a). If investor protection is to be maximized, it is essential that this privilege be extended to plaintiffs suing under section 14(e). The Court in Borak
acknowledged the SEC's limitations in regulating proxy contests. 116
The need for regulation is even more acute in tender offers because they operate under more stringent time constraints. While a
proxy contest may last months, a control contest through tender
offer may last only weeks, or even days.1 1 7 Therefore, the target
company's shareholder is even more disadvantaged in a tender
offer situation because there may be insufficient opportunity to
make an informed investment decision.
The similarity between sections 14(a) and 14(e) militates for
similar treatment of parties injured by the perpetrators of fraud
during a control contest. The private right of action granted under
the proxy rules should also be available under the tender offer regulations.
Broad Statutory Language of Section 14(e)
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act was patterned after section
14(a)," i 8 which regulates proxy contests; courts recognize private
rights of action under section 14(a). Section 14(e) was also patterned after section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, the basic antifraud provision of the Exchange
Act. The similarity in language between rule 10b-5 and section
14(e), i i 9 which was enacted subsequent to the rule, indicates Congress' desire to grant similar remedies.
Rule 10b-5, under which private rights of action are well-established, 120 prohibits fraud and manipulative acts "in connection
116. The Court stated:
The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be expedited. Time does not permit
an independent examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and
this results in the Commission's acceptance of the representations contained
therein at their face value, unless contrary to the material on file with it ....
[U]nlawfil manipulation would not have been apparent to the Commission
until after the merger.
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).

117. Troubh, Purchase Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, 54 HARV.
Bus. REv., July-August, 79 (1976).
118.

See notes 114-115 supra and accompanying text.

119. Compare note 7 with note 43.
120.

See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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with the purchase or sale of any security.- 12 1 Section 14(e) prohibits fraud and manipulative acts "in connection with any tender
offer."' 122 Unless standing is granted to parties other than buyers or
sellers, section 14(e) is little more than a restatement of rule 10b-5.
Congress was aware of the "buyer-seller" requirement of rule
10b-512 3 when it enacted section 14(e). It chose, however, not to
use that limiting language, drafting section 14(e) as applicable to
any tender offer. Thus, it can be argued that Congress intended
section 14(e) to be available to a broad range of parties other than
buyers or sellers.
Policy of Evenhandedness
The majority viewed equal treatment of all contestants as
not necessarily creating a right to sue for damages under section
14(e).12 4 Evenhanded treatment of rivals for control, however, is
a basic tenet of the Williams Act. Congress was aware that tender
offers provide a means for removing inefficient management, and
did not want to subvert that function.' 2 5 The Senate and House
reports, which the majority heavily relied on, stated:
The Bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bid. It is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benand
efit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror
126
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
In barring the tender offeror's redress for his injury, the Court
is "tipping the balance"'12 7 toward target management; this result is
contrary to congressional intent. The incumbent management has
many tools at its command to defeat a takeover bid.' 2 8 On the
121.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).

122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
123. See Hearings on H.R. 14,475 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fi-

nance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1968) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23
Bus. Aw. 1091, 1114 (1968); Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers: Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARv. J. LEGIS. 431, 444
(1968).
124. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 943-44 (1977).
125. Senate Hearings,supra note 79, at 117.
126. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEvs 2811, 2813; S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
127. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813; S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
128. The methods used can include (1) different types of communications with
shareholders, urging them to reject the offer, see, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
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other hand, the takeover bidder has only one attraction for the
target company's shareholders, a higher price for their shares. The
Court's denial of standing to tender offerors gives the target company the opportunity to defraud a takeover bidder in a control contest, with immunity from suit. This is assuredly contrary to Congress' aim in enacting the Williams Act.
Investor Protection
An equally compelling rationale for granting a tender offeror
the right to sue is investor protection. There is a crucial need for
the target company's shareholders to receive accurate information
during a tender offer.1 29 The protection of the target company's
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977); (2) litigation for an alleged disclosure violation involving
(a) the background of the offeror, see, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp.
579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); (b) the impact that the offeror's control will have on the target
company, see, e.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); (c) relationships between the target and
the bidder, see, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotel Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1973); (d) alleged antitrust violations, see, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great
AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v.
Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); (3) securing a better offer from a
friendly third party; (4) an acquisition in the same or related field to create antitrust
hurdles for the bidder, see, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F.
Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969); (5) issuance of a stock dividend; (6) threatened resignations of key employees. See generally E. AsuANow & H.'EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973); D. AUSTIN & J FISHiAN, CORPORATIONS
IN CONFLiCT-THE TENDER OFFER 121-39 (1970); Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in

Tender Offers, REV. SEC. REG., Oct. 15, 1976, at 853; Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of
Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV., March-April, 135, 142-47 (1967); Schmults
& Kelly, Cash Take-over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1967); Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association, Defending
Target Companies-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAw. 1349 (1977). For a recent successful defense against an attempted takeover, see Serrin, How Gerber Foiled a Takeover, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
129. The dilemma of the shareholder was expressed by the House Committee
Report:
The public shareholder must, therefore, with severely limited information, decide what course of action he should take. He has many alternatives.
He can tender all of his shares immediately and hope they are all purchased.
However, if the offer is for less than all the outstanding shares, perhaps only
a part of them will be taken. In these instances, he will remain a shareholder in the company, under a new management which he has helped to
install without knowing whether it will be good or bad for the company.
The shareholder, as another alternative may wait to see if a better offer
develops, but if he tenders late, he runs the risk that none of his shares will
be taken. He may also sell his shares in the market or hold them and hope
for the best. Without knowledge of who the bidder is and what he plans to
do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed decision. He is forced to take
a chance. For no matter what he does, he does it without adequate informa-
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shareholders is a major goal of the Williams Act. However, the
appropriate means of achieving this goal is in dispute.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the majority incorrectly excluded the takeover bidder from the purview of the Williams Act. He believed that it is necessarily these bidders, not the
shareholders, who have the greatest interest in the litigation and in
seeking interpretation of the law. Justice Stevens stated:
The potential litigants who have the most to gain from enforcement of the statute-and the most to lose if its provisions can be
ignored with the impunity-are plainly the rival contestants.
Surely the contestants are in a much better position-and have a
much greater incentive-than a mere shareholder to detect and
to challenge conduct prohibited by the Williams Act.130
Chris-Craft is the most appropriate party to bring the suit in
our adversary tradition. "[I]t is fundamental in our adversary system that the selfish interest of the litigant provides the best
guarantee that a claim will be effectively asserted."' 13 1 If the tender
offeror is rendered unable to sue for damages, then one of the

most effective watchdogs for compliance with the Williams Act is
tion to enable him to decide rationally what is the best possible course of
action. This is precisely the kind of dilemma which our Federal securities
laws are designed to prevent.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2812.
130. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 959 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
131. Id. at 960. Furthermore, a draftsman of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 stated: "[Tihere is no policeman so effective as the one whose pocketbook is
affected by the degree to which he enforces the law." Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S.
Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) pt. 15, National Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6518 (1934). Additionally, Chris-Craft has standing to sue in the
constitutional sense. The Supreme Court stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968), that a threshold question is presented by the provision in U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, limiting federal judicial power to cases and controversies: "The gist of the
question of standing is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends .... "
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)). Although Chris-Craft had a stake in the outcome which meets the article III
requirement, this does not necessarily mean it has a right to sue. Because there is no
provision in section 14(e) specifically authorizing the plaintiff to sue, the Constitution requires analysis of the statute to determine whether a private right of action
can be implied, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). After undertaking such an analysis, see Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 941-50 (1977), the majority held that no private right to
sue by a defeated tender offeror was intended.
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eliminated. As Justice Stevens indicated: "Congress would not
32
[preclude] the person most interested in effective enforcement"
from bringing private damage actions. Shareholders will also be
protected if the tender offeror has the right to sue target management, since "[i]ndividual shareholders often lack the capacity to
133
litigate these cases effectively."'
A tender offeror's private action also protects those target
company shareholders who accept the exchange offer and become
stockholders in the offering company. These shareholders who accepted Chris-Craft's exchange offer knowingly risked that ChrisCraft might lose the takeover contest, "[b]ut they did not assume
the risk that Bangor Punta would illegally deprive Chris-Craft of its
opportunity to gain control."' 134 These shareholders clearly fall
within the class section 14(e) was intended to protect. Compensating Chris-Craft most effectively assists these investors: They become holders in a company whose assets are $36 million greater.
The majority decided that although a damage award might indirectly benefit those former Piper shareholders who accepted
Chris-Craft's exchange offer, it would injure Piper shareholders
who exchanged their holdings for Bangor Punta stock; Bangor Punta stock would lose value on the market because of the adverse
judgment. 135 However, any damage award against Bangor Punta
in even a stockholder suit such as that approved in Borak could decrease the value of Bangor Punta stock.
The majority also found that damage actions do not necessarily
deter fraud in tender offers. While it is true that the "deterrent
value . . . can never be ascertained with precision,"' 136 such value

may nonetheless be significant. The majority noted that it is more
likely that shareholders will be injured because some offerors will
be deterred from even making a bid. 137 However, it is more likely
that allowing either side to violate the securities laws with impunity from private damage actions will discourage even more offers from taking place. Stated directly: "[N]o rational businessman
would make a multi-million dollar offer.

. .

if he were impotent to

protect himself against foul practices by his opponents.'
132.

38

The

Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct., 926, 960 (1977) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
133. Id. at 963.
134.

Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 948.
Id.
See id. at 948-49.
Brief for Chris-Craft, supra note 20, at 38.
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Court's objective, investor protection, is entirely consistent with
affording the contesting parties standing to sue. Only by permitting
these suits will violations of the securities laws be most effectively
discouraged.
Application of Cort v. Ash
The majority improperly relied on Cort v. Ash:' 39 The Supreme Court had previously recognized private rights of action
140 It
under sections 10(b) and 14(a), the models for section 14(e).
is likely that Congress intended to extend the same protection
under the Williams Act. Therefore, Chris-Craft does not present
the same type of issue considered in Cort, namely, whether the
statute created an implied private remedy. Rather, the real issue
presented in Chris-Craft was who may invoke the remedy. Viewed
in this light, Chris-Craft should be controlled by the rationale in
14 1
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.
Cort set forth a four-pronged test to determine whether a private remedy should be implied in a given statute. The first prong
14 2
requires that the plaintiff be a member of an "especial class."'
Borak involved a derivative suit brought for a violation of section
14(a) of the Exchange Act. Although these shareholders fell within
the class of intended beneficiaries, the remedy was awarded to the
corporation. Borak, therefore, does not meet the "especial class"
test deemed crucial in Cort. However, instead of overruling Borak,
the Supreme Court in Cort distinguished the facts in Cort, stating
that there is "at least a statutory basis [section 14(a)] for inferring
that a civil cause of action lay in favor of someone."' 43 This argument also applies in Chris-Craft: Section 14(e) is quite similar to
both section 14(a) and rule 10b-5, where private rights of action are
well-established. Borak, as authority for permitting private actions
for violations of the proxy rules, is further support for the existence
of such a right where violations of tender offer rules have taken
place, since the two sets of rules are similarly drawn.
Nowhere in Cort did the Court find it essential that a statute
meet all four factors to imply a private cause of action. Thus, assuming arguendo that Cort is controlling, Chris-Craft easily meets
the remaining three considerations.
139.
140.
141.
142.

422
See
377
422

143.

Id. at 79.

U.S. 66 (1975).
text accompanying notes 114-115, 118-119 supra.
U.S. 426 (1964).
U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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In applying the second prong of the Cort test, Chief Justice
Burger indicated that although Congress did not expressly deny a
damages remedy to tender offerors as a class, neither did it expressly create one. 14 4 In Cort the majority acknowledged that a
"pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between
the plaintiff class and the defendant class" 145 could substitute for an
"'articulated federal right in the plaintiff.' 146 Chris-Craft involved
just such a pervasive legislative scheme, since the Williams Act
was designed to regulate extensively the conduct between the opposing parties in a tender offer. Yet, the Court ignored this in
denying Chris-Craft standing.
The third prong of the Cort test requires that the private
remedy be necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose in
enacting the statute. 14 7 Assuming that the sole class which Congress intended to protect through the Williams Act was the
shareholders, to permit either side to sue would further that end.
Allowing private actions is imperative if the goal of investor protec14 8
tion is to be attained.
In applying the fourth requirement of the Cort test, the Court
found that Chris-Craft might have an adequate remedy at state law
and, therefore, should not rely on section 14(e). 149 Chief Justice
Burger suggested that Chris-Craft could bring a tort action under
common law for "interference with a prospective commercial advantage."' 150 This tort follows the same general principles as the
tort of interference with contractual relations. 15 ' The latter tort requires some tortious conduct, such as fraud or defamation before
recovery may be granted.' 52 Without such conduct, recovery is
denied although the interference was intentional. More importantly, proof of defendant's malice is a prerequisite to recovery.1 53
144.
145.

Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 947 (1977).
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).

146. Id.
147. Id. at 78.
148. See notes 129-138 supra and accompanying text.
149. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 949 (1977).
150. Id. Chris-Craft followed the Chief Justice's advice. On August 10, 1977,
Chris-Craft instituted an action in New York State Supreme Court against Bangor
Punta, Piper, and former officers of each company. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1977, § D,
at 7, col. 4. However, this action was subsequently abandoned. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1977, at 33, col. 1. Chris-Craft also agreed to sell all of its Piper shares to Bangor
Punta for $70 a share, ending the eight-year battle for control. Id.
151. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 949, 952 (4th ed. 1971).
152. Id. at 951.
153. Id. at 952.
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To succeed in tort, Chris-Craft would have to prove that Bangor Punta had the requisite malicious intent. This is a far heavier
burden of proof than that required by section 14(e), which merely
requires a showing of fraud. Chris-Craft had already proven fraud
in the lower courts. 154 In most hostile tender offers, the opposing
parties' goals are simply to gain or retain control. Many Williams
Act violations occur in the heat of the battle for control without any
party intending to defraud. 155 Hence, unable to show malicious intent, a defeated tender offeror has little hope of redress for his
injury.
SEC Constructionof the Statute
A further justification for Chris-Craft's standing to sue for
damages under section 14(e) is the position of the SEC. Courts
traditionally defer to the interpretation of a statute by an agency
which played a significant role in its drafting and which is responsible for its enforcement. 1 56 In its amicus curiae brief in
Chris-Craft, the SEC argued that Chris-Craft had standing under
section 14(e). The Commission contended that "[e]ven more necessary [than in Borak] are such private rights of action to supplement
Commission action to effectuate the Congressional purposes in
157
enacting the Williams Act."'
Chief Justice Burger denigrated what he termed the "limited
value"'158 of the SEC's "presumed 'expertise' '159 in ascertaining
whether there is an implied right of action under section 14(e). He
stated that the issue is "one peculiarly reserved for judicial
resolution.' 6 0 The majority stated further that in previous deci154. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 365-73 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
155. Judge Friendly acknowledged this lack of intention to defraud in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969):
[T]he participants on both sides act, "not in the peace of a quiet chamber,"
* , * but under the stresses of the market place. They act quickly, sometimes
impulsively, often in angry response to what they consider, whether rightly
or wrongly, to be low blows by the other side. Probably there will no more
be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial.
Id. at 948 (citation omitted).
156. See United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 717-19
(1975); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1973); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965).
157. Amicus curiae brief by SEC at 12, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.
Ct. 926 (1977).
158. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 949 n.27 (1977).
159. Id.
160. Id. The majority further argued that the position asserted in the SEC's
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sions involving implied causes of action,' 61 the Court did not invoke the administrative deference rule. This argument is not convincing: In all the cases cited, 16 2 the Court arrived at the result
advocated by the SEC. In Chris-Craft the SEC's informed determination that private suits are necessary to aid in the enforcement
of the Exchange Act should have been approved.
1970 Amendment of the Williams Act
In 1970, Congress amended the Williams Act,' 6 3 conferring
power on the SEC to promulgate additional rules deemed necessary to effectuate the statute's aims. Most significant concerning
the amendment, however, is that Congress had had the opportunity to limit the number of parties who could sue under section 14(e), but did not draft any such limitation. Indeed, Senator
Williams recognized the need to take affirmative steps to combat
the problems caused by management's opposition to takeover
bids. 164 This further indicates the impropriety of limiting the
number of parties able to bring suit. When courts or administrative
agencies interpret a statutory provision and Congress subsequently
amends the statute without amending the interpreted provision,
"[this interpretation] is deemed to have received Congressional approval and has the effect of law."'1 6 5 Thus, the 1970 amendment,
which followed the precedents establishing standing under section
14(e)' 66 should have been regarded as a codification of those authorities.
amicus curiae brief was inconsistent with that expressed by Chairman Cohen during

the legislative hearings on § 14(e). However, a careful analysis of the legislative
history, see, e.g., House Hearings,supra note 123, at 59; Senate Hearings,supra note
79, at 178, 184, indicates that Chairman Cohen advocated that a private right of action should be implied.
161. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
162. See cases cited note 161 supra.
163. Act of Aug. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497 (amending 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. V 1969)).
164. 116 CONG. REc. 29,252 (1970) (remarks of Senator Williams).
165. Commissioner v. Noel Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965); accord, Electronic
Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 14 (1939); Dragor Shipping Corp. v.
Union Tank Car Co., 371 F.2d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1967).
166. See, e.g., Butler Aviation Int'l v. Comprehensive Designers Inc., 425 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 418 F.2d 963 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Although standing for all parties in takeover contests has re167
ceived considerable support in lower courts and in commentary,
the Court maintained that the issue was one of "first impression."' 68
Petitioners in Chris-Craft cited only one case where standing had
been denied, Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.169 Klaus, however, was inapposite: It involved the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to show irreparable injury. The plaintiffs in Klaus must have had standing, or
the court would never have reached the issue of irreparable injury.
Policy Considerations
The Court observed that if it were to allow a tender offeror to
seek damages, some tender offers "may never be made if there is a
possibility of massive damage claims."' 70 Recent history dispels
these apprehensions. The number of tender offers since ChrisCraft II, where damages were granted, has steadily increased. Presently, tender offers are the most popular form of takeover device. 17 Indeed, if encouraging tender offers is the Court's goal,
167. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 n.20 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482
F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973) (right of defeated tender offeror to sue for damages); Alaska
Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975) (standing of tender
offeror in contest between two public companies); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking
Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971) (shareholder of tender offeror); E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 286-88 (1973); Bromberg,
The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462, 554 (1969); Mundheim, Tender Offers, 2 REv. SEC. REG. 953, 956 (1969); Note, Chris-Craft and Loss of Opportunity to Control: The Lost Opportunity, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 820, 821 (1975);
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1260 (1973); Comment, Tender Offers: The
Liberalization of Standing Requirements Under Section 14(e), 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 561
(1973).
168. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 931 (1977).
169. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
170. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 948 (1977).
171. Appleton, The Proposed Requirements, 32 Bus. LAw. 1381 (1977). (The
author is Chief, Office of Tender Offers, Acquisitions and Small Issues, SEC.) Tender offers have become so prevalent that there has been a recent spate of state
takeover statutes. These enactments were motivated, at least in part, by the states'
desire to protect local businesses from foreign takeovers, id. at 1381. See generally
State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187 (1976). As of July
15, 1977, 30 states had passed this form of legislation. Wall St. J., July 15, 1977, at 1,
col. 6. The constitutionality of these statutes is in question, however. Idaho's
takeover statute was recently held preempted by the Williams Act, and thus an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
[1977] 419 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) M-1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1977). For a discussion
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then a grant of standing to both the tender offerors and the target
172
company's management is essential.
The Court's decision will effectively shift the burden of enforcing the Williams Act to the SEC. However, serious manpower
shortages detract from the ability of the Commission to police
these offers. This realistic assessment has been made by both the
173
Court in Borak and by the SEC.
Disallowing private suits "creates an incentive to violate the
Act in retaliation for violations by the other side."' 174 If "selfhelp" 1 75 becomes attractive to one who believes the judicial pro-

cess unresponsive to his needs, takeover battles will be reduced to
a form of "jungle warfare.'

17 6

This result is assuredly not what the

Court desires. Nonetheless, it seems destined to occur if the
Chris-Craft rationale is preserved.
The Court's expressed desire to encourage tender offers led to
its denial of standing in Chris-Craft.177 Without more convincing
reasoning, it might be inferred that the denial of Chris-Craft's
claim is fundamentally a reaction to the unprecedented $36 million
judgment.
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court was reviewing the damage
award as calculated by the Second Circuit in 1975. However, the
questions addressed by the Court had been adjudicated in 1973 in
Chris-Craft 11.178 In Chris-Craft II the matters of standing and
liability were discussed extensively. The court held that Chris-Craft
had an implied right of action under section 14(e), 179 and that it
was entitled to damages for the defendant's violations of the securities laws.' 80 When defendants petitioned the Supreme Court
of state takeover statutes' constitutionality, see Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap:
State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
172. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
173. This point was articulated in Borak, where the SEC stated that it reviewed over 2,000 proxy statements annually, see note 116 supra. Harvey Pitt, General Counsel for the SEC, stated the Court's refusal to allow private enforcement
actions of this type placed more responsibility on the SEC to regulate tender offers.
He observed that this "could impose a significant manpower burden" on the Commission. Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
174. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 963 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Brief for Chris-Craft, supra note 20, at 61.
177. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 948-49 (1977).
178. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
179. Id. at 362.
180. Id. at 366, 369, 373.
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for certiorari, the petition was denied."" 1 Only after Chris-Craft
was awarded damages of $36 million did the Supreme Court agree
to hear the case. As Justice Stevens stated in dissent: "The fact
that error may have been committed in this case in the consideration of the liability and damage issues-or might be committed in
other cases-should not be permitted to color the analysis of the
threshold standing issue." 18 2 Calculating damages in a securities
context is extremely difficult and complex. 18 3 The Court was understandably wary in dealing with this issue: Denial of standing is
one way to avoid the problem. However, the basic policy of liberally construing securities legislation to protect investors militated in
favor of standing for Chris-Craft under section 14(e), notwithstanding the $36 million judgment.
Standing of Other Parties
a. Shareholder Rights
Left unanswered by the Court's decision was whether section
14(e) provides a private action right of damages for any party other
than the takeover bidder. The majority clearly limited its holding
to denying such right to a defeated takeover bidder.1 8 4 The Court
refrained from deciding whether shareholders of the target corporation have an implied cause of action under section 14(e). 185 Noting
in a footnote 8 6 that it declined to decide this issue, the Court relied
on the premise that it was the shareholder of the target company,
not the offeror, who needed the protection of the Williams Act.
With its belief that the individual investor is a focus of the
legislation, the majority would have been hard-pressed to deny the
applicability of Borak, which granted an implied right of action
under section 14(a). The Court had distinguished Borak on the
ground that a derivative suit is necessary to effectuate the aims of
the statute.' 8 7 According to the Court, the Williams Act was aimed
at protecting the target company's shareholders. Under that reason181. See First Boston Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
182. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 963 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
183. 3 L. Loss, SEcusuTiEs REGULATON 1792-93 (1961); 6 id. at 3920 n.370b
(Supp. 1969).
184. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 949 n.28 (1977).
185. See id. Chris-Craft had argued that all concerned parties have standing
under § 14(e). See Brief for Chris-Craft, supra note 20, at 38-54.
186. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 949 n.28 (1977).
187. Id. at 944-45.
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ing, allowing a private damage action by these shareholders would
be consistent with both Borak and Chris-Craft.
The four prongs in the test which determines whether a private cause of action can be implied under Cort v. Ash 188 militate in
favor of granting standing to the target company's shareholders.
Shareholders assuredly fall within the class "for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted."' 89 The Court itself noted that it
was this very class which the Williams Act was enacted to protect.
The Court would probably view these shareholders as the intended
190
beneficiaries of the statute.
With regard to the second factor enumerated in Cort, the
Court in Chris-Craft interpreted Congress' intention as a desire "to
curb the unregulated activities of tender offerors."' 9 1 It mentioned
that Congress may possibly have intended to protect shareholders
who did not tender their stock. 192 Because these shareholders are
viewed as the intended beneficiaries of the legislation, granting
them the right to sue for damages is appropriate. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that Congress intended to deny this remedy
to shareholders.
Under the third prong of the Cort test, section 14(e)'s goals
would be fostered by allowing the target company's shareholders to
sue for damages. In a tender offer, the shareholder of the target
company can be injured in two ways. First, he may be induced to
tender his shares for inadequate compensation.' 9 3 Resulting financial loss thereby may be measured as the difference between compensation for the shares and their worth.
Second, he may retain his shares while other shareholders
tender their shares to "unworthy newcomers." 1 94 The shareholder
thereby suffers a loss by holding a block of stock in a company of
which he no longer desires to be part. 195 It is a fundamental precept of our legal system that a party who has been wronged may
seek compensation for injury. It is also entirely consistent with
the goal of investor protection to allow the shareholder to sue the
defrauding party. The Court has held that a tender offeror cannot
188. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
189. Id. at 78.

190. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 942-49 (1977).
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 947.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
See note 129 supra.
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sue in this situation, even for the benefit of the shareholder. Therefore, it is essential to grant the individual shareholder this right;
otherwise, his protection under the legislative scheme will be severely circumscribed.
Finally, there is no evidence that the cause of action is one
"traditionally relegated to state law,"' 19 6 the fourth component of
the Cort test. The form of relief which shareholders have sought
has been private actions under section 14(e). As of this writing,
there has been only one case where a party has been forced to rely
upon state law: Chris-Craft.197 Presently, there is no indication that
an adequate state remedy exists.
In sum, if the Court were to decide whether there is an implied cause of action for shareholders under section 14(e), it would
be forced to answer in the affirmative. The Court's decision in
Chris-Craft is replete with recognition that this class is the intended beneficiary of the legislation. It is essential that this group
be allowed to bring a private suit for damages if the congressional
goal of investor protection is to be realized. Furthermore, an
analysis of Cort v. Ash,' 9 8 a case which the majority considered
crucial, demonstrates that this class is entitled to sue for damages.
Chris-Craft'sStatus as a Piper Shareholder
The majority noted that Chris-Craft was suing in the posture
of a contestant for control, and not as a shareholder.19 9 Therefore,
Chris-Craft was not entitled to the standing privileges that would
probably be afforded a shareholder. The majority believed that
Chris-Craft's claim should be denied because damages were sought
under "Chris-Craft's status as a contestant for control,"2 0 0 and not
under its status as a shareholder. The majority thus implied that a
shareholder who is not in the position of a takeover bidder may
have standing to sue while a shareholder who is also a bidder may
not have standing. This necessarily discriminates against one group
of shareholders.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens assumed the opposite position:
that Chris-Craft could sue as a Piper shareholder. He believed that
a target company's shareholder is injured when other shareholders
b.

196.

197.
198.
199.
200.

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
See note 150 supra.

422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 947 (1977).
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 11
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 6: 203

are fraudulently induced to tender their holdings. 20 ' This shareholder would then be part of a company whose management he
neither wanted nor helped to install. 20 2 He would still have the
option of selling his shares, but may suffer a loss in so doing. One
determining factor in calculating Chris-Craft's damages was the loss
it suffered from being locked-in as holder of a large block of Piper
stock. 20 3 These damages are distinguishable from the damages aris204
ing out of the loss of control premium.
The Supreme Court asserted that the loss from being lockedin related only to Chris-Craft's position as a tender offeror and not
to its position as an "ordinary" Piper shareholder. 20 5 The Court
reasoned that Chris-Craft was an atypical shareholder who would
not fall within the registration exemptions to section 4(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933206 because of its large holdings. It would
thus be forced to file a registration statement with the SEC to
dispose of its Piper stock. The Court's analysis is faulty because it
does not distinguish between Chris-Craft and other large holders of
Piper stock. Any holder of a large block of Piper stock would probably not fall under one of the exemptions to the registration process provided in section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Thus,
according to the Court's reasoning, any large shareholder who was
injured because Bangor Punta had gained control would be unable
to recover damages.
The majority found "that in no meaningful sense was either
Chris-Craft or Bangor Punta . . . a 'target shareholder' of Piper

Aircraft." 20 7 The Court overlooked that Chris-Craft had the same
options open to it that the other Piper shareholders had: to retain
the stock, to sell it, to try to acquire more, or even to tender it to
an opposing tender offeror. If, in July 1969, Chris-Craft had decided that Bangor Punta's exchange offer was more attractive than
control of Piper, Chris-Craft would have been entitled, as any
other shareholder, to exchange its shares pursuant to the offer.
Chris-Craft would have needed accurate disclosure by Bangor
Punta as much as any other Piper shareholder.
201. See id. at 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. See notes 74-75 supra.
204. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 957 n.6 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
205. See id. at 947.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
207. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 946 n.23 (1977). Instead,
the Court viewed Chris-Craft solely as a takeover bidder.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S SECOND HOLDING:

DENIAL OF STANDING UNDER RULE 10b-6.

Rule 10b-6 prohibits bids for, or purchases of, a security by or
on behalf of the issuer of a security if the security is "the subject of
• . . [a] distribution." 20 s This includes prohibitions on bids for or
purchases of "any right to purchase such security."2 09 This rule is
designed to prevent stimulative trading by an issuer in its own
securities in order to create a deceptive appearance of market
activity. 2 10 Purchases made during an exchange offer are presumed
to stimulate the price of the distributed security and therefore fall
within the rule.
The Second Circuit held, and the Supreme Court did not dispute, that Bangor Punta's cash purchases of Piper stock, concurrent
with its exchange offer, violated rule 10b-6. 2 11 However, the Supreme Court held that, in this particular case, Chris-Craft was
without standing to sue for Bangor Punta's violation of rule
10b-6.2 1 2 The Court rested its decision not on whether a violation
had occurred, but on how the complaint was stated. Chris-Craft's
error was in phrasing its right to damages on the basis of a lost opportunity to gain control of Piper. If Chris-Craft had asserted standing as a Piper shareholder and had complained that it was injured
because it had paid too much for the manipulated stock, it might
have been successful. 2 13 The majority construed rule 10b-6 very
narrowly, stating that the rule is aimed only at maintaining orderly markets for the distribution of securities. It decided that rule
10b-6 is "not directed at or concerned with contests for corporate
control." 2 14 The Court viewed Chris-Craft's complaint as "beyond
2 15
the bounds of the specific concern of Rule 10b-6."
However, nothing in the language or history of rule 10b-6
supports the Court's limited reading on tender offers. 2 16 In May
208. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3) (1977).
209. Id.
210.

E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

131 (1973).
211. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 377 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
212. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 952 (1977).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 951.
215. Id.
216. Rule lOb-6 does not contain the phrase "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security," which limits a cause of action under rule 10b-5, Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birubaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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1969, the SEC issued a release stating that purchases of stock of a
target corporation by a tender offeror while engaged in an exchange offer violated rule 10b-6.2 17 In promulgating these rules,
the SEC had interpreted rule 10b-6 as applying to takeover contests, as well as to more conventional distributions.
In the present instance, the Court assumed that the Piper
shareholders were deceived by the overvaluation of Bangor Punta's
exchange offer. This alleged value increase in the package made
Bangor Punta's exchange offer appear more favorable than Chris21 8
Craft's.
It is impossible to state with certainty that Chris-Craft would
have won the battle for control of Piper. It is clear, however, that
the seven percent acquired fraudulently was determinative of the
outcome of the contest. Without the seven percent illegally acquired, Bangor Punta would have had only 44%, not enough to be
assured of winning the takeover contest. Hence, the Supreme
Court's decision is inequitable. The court of appeals specifically
held that Bangor Punta violated rule 10b-6. 219 The Supreme Court
did not overturn this finding, 22 0 yet it refused to impose any sanctions on Bangor Punta. In effect, the Court held that even if one
has been harmed by a rule 10b-6 violation, his prayer for relief
must contain the proper verbiage. This meaningless distinction
elevates form over substance.

217. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1967), reprinted in
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,706, at 83,617.

218. The Court did not dispute the Second Circuit's determination that Bangor
Punta's cash purchase of Piper stock during its exchange offer constituted purchase
of "right[s] to purchase" Bangor Punta stock. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.
Ct. 926, 950 (1977). The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the cash purchases violated rule 10b-6, see id. at 950 n.30. However, the cash purchases were
of the type the rule was designed to prevent. The exchange offer was effectively
a distribution of Bangor Punta securities. The block purchases undoubtedly created
an unnatural and unwarranted appearance of market activity. The Second Circuit
has twice found that the purchases violated rule 10b-6, see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 576-77 (1970) (Chris-CraftI); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 377-78 (1973) (Chris-CraftII). The Court
interpreted the rule as protecting the "hoodwinked investor victimized by market
manipulation." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 951 (1977). ChrisCraft could have framed its complaint to include this injury. The impression given
by the Court's decision is that Chris-Craft would have been granted standing if it had
included as one of its allegations a claim that it paid too much for the Piper stock.
219. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 377 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
220. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 951 (1977).
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V.

THE SUPREME COURT'S THmID HOLDING:
OVERTURNING THE INJUNCTION

The Supreme Court also overturned the injunction prohibiting
Bangor Punta from voting the illegally acquired Piper shares for
five years.221 The right of the parties to bring injunctive actions
was not disputed. 222 In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. ,223 the
Court discussed standards for injunctive relief under the Williams
Act. Such discussion certainly implies the availability of an injunction against Williams Act violations.
Importantly, neither of the parties raised the injunction issue
in their petitions for certiorari.2 24 Chief Justice Burger, explaining
225 anythat the Court had authority to decide the injunction issue
way, stated that review was necessary due to the "unusual circumstances" 226 presented by this case and because the injunction
227
"supplement[ed] an improper award of damages."
In the Court's view, Chris-Craft had waived any claim to
equitable relief in the prior trial. 228 Furthermore, the Court decided already that Chris-Craft did not have standing under section
14(e) or rule 10b-6 to bring a private action for damages. Accordingly, the majority viewed the injunction as "inappropriate
2 29
premised as it was upon the impermissible award of damages."
The majority's view that the injunction was "premised" upon the
award of damages is erroneous.
The Second Circuit favored, as Judge Timbers declared, denying to Bangor Punta "the fruits of [its] obtaining Piper shares
illegally." 230 This decision was based on two considerations. First,
the court of appeals in Chris-Craft II determined that Bangor
221. See id. at 952.
222. See Brief for Petitioner Bangor Punta Corp. at 46-47, Brief for Petitioner
Piper Aircraft Corp. at 38, Brief for Petitioner First Boston Co. at 24, Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
223. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
224. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 952 n.34 (1977).
225. Id. (citing State Bd. v. Correllis Sand & Gravel Co., 97 S. Ct. 582 (1977);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330
U.S. 395, 412 (1947); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32, 45 (1924)).
226. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 952 n.34 (1977).
227. Id.
228. See id. at 952.
229. Id.
230. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 380 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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Punta had violated these laws and that Chris-Craft was entitled to
compensation for injuries it had suffered. 2 31 Second, the Court did
23 2
not wish Bangor Punta to have control of Piper.
Therefore, the injunction was an independent remedy fashioned by the court to deal with Bangor Punta's violations of the
securities laws. If it had wanted to deal with the equitable relief,
the Court should have addressed the merits of the claims to determine if the situation warranted an injunction.
The injunction would have had the effect of granting control of
Piper to Chris-Craft for the five-year period. 2 33 Since the Supreme
Court had never determined whether Chris-Craft would have acquired control of Piper absent petitioners' violations, it would have
been unseemly for the Court to allow this particular result. By
denying Chris-Craft equitable relief, the Court effectively allowed
Bangor Punta to retain control of Piper without any sanctions.
VI.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRING OPINION:
THE STANDARD FOR CAUSATION

Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion 2 34 stated the reasons for
his belief that Chris-Craft had not established causation between
the petitioners' violations of the securities laws and its defeat in the
control contest for Piper. He enunciated a new, stricter standard
for proving causation in a securities case. According to Justice
Blackmun, the previous standards enunciated in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.2 35 and in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,2 36
do not adequately deal with the problems raised in tender offers.
His test places a greater burden on the aggrieved party to show
that the alleged violation caused the harm at issue. The Mills and
Affiliated Ute standard for proving causation in a securities case involves, first, a determination of whether the misstatement or omission was "material." Although the term has been variously interpreted, "materiality" most recently has been defined by the Su231. See id. at 362-80.
232. See id. at 380.

233. Instead of 1,644,790 shares of Piper outstanding, there would have been
only 1,413,788 (1,644,790, less the 120,200 shares Bangor Punta acquired through
its three off-exchange block purchases and less the 110,802 shares acquired through
its misleading exchange offer). Chris-Craft would then have owned approximately
49% of Piper's outstanding shares, enough to control the company, or to enable ChrisCraft to purchase easily enough shares for a majority.
234. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 953-55 (1977) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
235. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
236. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss1/11

36

Berns: Chris-Craft: Changing Perspectives on Contests for Corporate Cont
19771

CHRIS-CRAFT: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

preme Court to mean that "the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberation of the reasonable shareholder." 2 37 It is undisputed by both the Second Circuit in ChrisCraft 11238 and by Justice Blackmun that the petitioner's misstatements and omissions were of sufficient magnitude to be material.
The next step requires analysis of whether a connection or
"essential link ' 39 between the misstatement or omission and the
alleged injury has been shown. Under Mills once materiality is
demonstrated, causation is shown if the misleading proxy statement
240
was an "essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.Subsequent to the decision in Mills, the Court elaborated on this
test in Affiliated Ute:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite for
recovery. All that is necessary is that facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important in the making of this decision .... The obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish
24
the requisite element of causation in fact. '
After Affiliated Ute, causation should not have been difficult
for Chris-Craft to prove. The letters and press releases Piper sent
out in January 1969 were clearly material. The misstatements and
omissions placed Chris-Craft in a less favorable light.
Similarly, causation also would have been easily established in
connection with the exchange offer through which Bangor acquired
7% of Piper's stock. In the registration statement accompanying the
exchange offer, the omission of Bangor Punta's $13 million loss was
material. 242 The Piper shareholders were faced with competing exchange offers; they responded by tendering 112,000 shares to
Chris-Craft and 111,600 to Bangor Punta.2 43 It is not unreasonable
to believe that disclosure of the large BAR loss would have had an
2 44
impact on the number of shares Bangor Punta attracted.
237. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
238. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364-69 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
239. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
240. Id.
241. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
242. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 368 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
243. Id. at 354.
244. BAR's $13 million loss would have eliminated 36% of Bangor Punta's re-
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Bangor Punta's purchases of 7% of Piper stock in May 1969, in
violation of rule 10b-6, were also critical. 24 5 Since Bangor Punta
eventually acquired only 51% of the Piper shares, without these
blocks of stock Bangor Punta would not have gained control.
However, Justice Blackmun would have expanded the causation criteria: "[T]he offeror must show that the shareholders' reactions to the misstatements or omissions caused the injury for which
it demands remuneration." 24 6 Justice Blackmun advocated the
2 47
adoption of the "but-for" requirement of traditional tort law.
Under Justice Blackmun's standard, Chris-Craft would have to
show that "but-for" petitioners' violations of the securities laws, it
would have acquired control of Piper. This is a much stricter standard than the "essential link" test. Previous court decisions recognized the impracticality and unrealistic nature of such a
standard. 248 Essentially, Justice Blackmun would require that
Chris-Craft show that all those shares that Bangor Punta illegally
acquired would have gone to Chris-Craft instead. There are
numerous factors that enter into a shareholder's investment decision. To require Chris-Craft to show how these particular shares
would have been transferred is an impossible burden. The Second
Circuit stated:
[I]t would be unduly burdensome to require an offeror to
prove actual reliance when, as here, there are numerous shareholders who undoubtedly possess a wide range of expertise and
tained earnings and 12% of its equity, and converted Bangor Punta's earnings from

more than $3 per share to a loss of almost $1.30 per share. Brief for Chris-Craft,
supra note 20, at 82.
245. This view was supported by the Second Circuit's decision in Chris-Craft
II. Judge Timbers found: "Since [Bangor Punta] eventually acquired only about 51%
of the outstanding Piper shares, it is clear that the 7% acquired through its exchange
offer was critical to its success." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Judge Gurfein stated that
"the seven percent illegally acquired by [Bangor Punta] caused it to win." Id. at 393
(Gurfein, J., concurring).
246. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926, 954 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
247. This approach was proposed in Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain Evolution of Section 14(e), 76 COLUM. L. REv. 634, 640-59 (1976).
248. The Court noted this when Justice Harlan declared that the "essential
link" test would "avoid the impracticality of determining how many votes were affected .. . and [would] effectuate the Congressional policy of ensuring that the
shareholders are able to make an informed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970). Justice
Harlan also noted in Mills that "proof of actual reliance by thousands of individuals
would . . . not be feasible; and reliance on the nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult matter to define or prove." Id. at 382 n.5 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
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knowledge. It would be impractical to require [Chris-Craft] to
prove that each individual Piper shareholder who failed to trade
for [Chris-Craft's] stock, or who traded for [Bangor Punta's]
stock, relied upon defendants' misrepresentations in doing so. 2 49
Assuming arguendo that Justice Blackmun's standard of causation is correct, an examination of the facts compels the conclusion
that Chris-Craft would have gained control of Piper absent the
petitioners' violations of the securities laws.
Justice Blackmun's first error was in treating each violation
separately to determine whether the particular violation caused
Chris-Craft to be defeated.2 5 0 Instead, he should have evaluated
the series of violations jointly to determine if they prevented
Chris-Craft from gaining control of Piper. There is no rationale for
examining the violations independently: In fact, they possess a
synergistic quality. Their aggregate effect should determine causation. Therefore, they should be examined from that more realistic
perspective.
By examining these violations jointly, one may fairly conclude
that in all probability, Chris-Craft would have been successful in its
takeover attempt. Bangor Punta acquired 7% of Piper stock for
cash in violation of rule 10b-6 and acquired an additional 7%
through its materially misleading exchange offer. Without either of
these illegally obtained blocks, Bangor Punta would have had less
than 50% of the Piper stock. Chris-Craft would then have led by at
least a 41% to 31% margin at the end of the competing exchange
offers in August 1969. The Second Circuit in Chris-Craft III noted
that such a lead would have commanded a premium for the opportunity to gain control. 2 5 ' Additionally, Chris-Craft would undoubtedly have had an even greater lead; its opponents' fraudulent activities dissuaded Piper's public shareholders from tendering even
249. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
250. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 954-55 (1977) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Justice Blackmun first examined the letters and press releases sent
out by Piper in January 1969. He decided that "Chris-Craft [had] failed to prove that
the Piper actions caused the injury of which Chris-Craft complain[ed]." Id. at 954.
Next, Justice Blackmun analyzed the actions of Bangor Punta and First Boston. He
concluded that "neither Bangor nor First Boston may be held liable" for the alleged
violations regarding the BAR negotiations. Id. at 955. Finally, he examined the alleged rule 10b-6 violations in determining that Chris-Craft had failed to prove that
the violations had caused its defeat. Id.
251. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 184-90
(2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97
S. Ct. 926 (1977).
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more shares to Chris-Craft at the beginning of the tender offer and
25 2
during the exchange offer.
Assuming that Chris-Craft's lead would have been at least 41%
to 31% in August 1969, it is unlikely that Bangor Punta would have
invested the $9 million necessary to purchase these blocks on the
open market.2 53 The risks involved would have been too great.
Chris-Craft, on the other hand, would have been in a far superior
position to garner the additional 9% needed to win the takeover
contest.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's denial of standing to seek damages
under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will
assuredly work against the interests of the investing public. If the
party with the greatest financial incentive, the takeover bidder, is
eliminated from effectively challenging violations of the Williams
Act, then the small shareholders and investors also lose a measure
of protection.
The SEC's recognition of its own limitation in dealing with
this area2 54 highlights the need for damage actions under the Williams Act. The Supreme Court in Chris-Craft denied tender offerors the right to bring suit under section 14(e) in what may be an
attempt to cut back on the amount of litigation in the courts. Although this may appear inconsistent with the congressional intent
of protecting investors, it is not inconsistent with the recent restrictive trend of Supreme Court decisions involving the securities
laws. The Supreme Court has repeatedly increased the plaintiff's
2 55
burden in areas such as scienter, standing, and harm.
252. Only 304,606 shares of Piper were tendered to Chris-Craft, Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 931 (1977), despite its offered price of $12.50
more than the stock's previous selling price. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
253. Brief for Chris-Craft, supra note 20, at 81.
254. See notes 116 & 173 supra and accompanying text.
255. The Supreme Court's trend limiting access to the courts is apparent by
its recent decisions, see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977) (suit
challenging short-form merger belonged in state, not federal, court); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter, not mere negligence, required in private
action under rule 10b-5); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (litigant must show irreparable harm to obtain injunction barring defendant's violations
of Williams Act); United Hous. Foundations, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
(narrowed definition of "security"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (right to sue for rule 10b-5 violation limited to only persons who
actually bought or sold security); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975) (successful environmental plaintiff not entitled to attorneys' fees).
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To reverse this trend, Congress should expressly articulate the
parameters of a cause of action under section 14(e). If Congress
truly desires to protect investors and not to "[tip the balance of
regulation in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bid,"256 it will expressly provide for private damage
suits under the Williams Act. Past decisions speak of an implied
right of action under the Williams Act. 257 Congress should either
amend the present section 14(e) or enact a new section to include an
express right. This would obviate the need for deliberation as to
whether an implied right was intended. In this way, the right of
tender offeror and target company to sue each other will be specifically recognized. Until this occurs, investor protection cannot be
maximized, and the congressional intent will be frustrated.
James A. Berns
256. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
257. See cases cited note 167 supra.
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